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Chapter 4 
Pricing Strategy:  
Theoretical Analysis, Data and Case Study 
 
Through interviews with firms and through material research, we identified several 
problems around the controversies in China’s pharmaceutical industry. Of these, we 
took the following factors to analyze and to discuss: (1) the nature of demand for Giffen 
Goods under “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs”, (2) patent protection and new drug 
protection, (3) retail price caps and auctions at procurement and (4) the choice of 
investment in R&D drugs or generic production. Here, we are going to set up simple 
models and examine the data of a drug class called Statins in China. 
 
1. Literature  
 
1.1 Focus on the Pricing Strategy  
 
Pricing is an important strategic tool firms, although there are government regulations 
on it  for pharmaceutical industries in most economies. A firm’s pricing policy is 
affected substantially by such environments such as (1) competition, (2) bargaining 
power with buyers, (3) the governments’ intervention in pricing, such as a maximum 
retail price cap, and (4) institutions such as patents or new drug protection in China or 
auctions. In this chapter, we will analyze how the environment affects a firm’s pricing 
strategy. 
 
Hospitals’ deep reliance on the drug price margin, “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs” is a 
key source of problems that affect the complete medical system in China: patients, 
medical insurance, hospitals, the health sector, and the pharmaceutical industry. We will 
not analyze why this phenomenon evolved, but we will analyze what situation will be 
come as a result of this environment continuing, and we will evaluate the impact of 
several policies. Hospitals’ close dependence on the drug price margin generates an 
unusual kind of demand in the pharmaceutical industry: industry customers prefer more 
expensive goods, even when the quality of goods is identical – this is called Giffen 
Goods in economic textbooks. This is not unique in China, however. The Japanese 
National Medical Insurance system also suffered from this, and overcame the problem 
by a gradual reform over 20 years from the late 1980s to the 2000s.  
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1.2 “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs” in Japan 
 
It is often observed around the world, particularly in developing economies where the 
social medical care system has not been properly established, that physicians are 
inclined to prescribe high-priced drugs in order to secure their own income. Japan also 
experienced this problem and subsequently underwent a reform for 20 years. 
 
One direct purchaser of drugs in Japan is the National Health Insurance, which is a 
compulsory medical insurance system, and the prices of drugs on the insurance 
catalogue is set by means of the Basic Drug Price Mechanism. As the National Health 
Insurance covers virtually 100% of the nation including dependents like children and 
retirees, drugs that are not on the catalogues are see practically no demand, in Japan, or 
very little. The Basic Drug Price Mechanism has been criticized for a long time as it 
generates the situation where physicians prescribe high-priced drugs to increase their 
own income. In the early 1980s, drug expenditure accounted for 40% of Japan’s total 
medical expenditure, which is almost the same level as currently in China.   
 
A reform of the medical system began to reduce drug expenditure by (1) reducing the 
Basic Drug Price Mechanism (1980-) and changing the price setting formula, and by 
means of (2) a payment scheme for hospitals: since 2003, reimbursement from 
insurance to hospitals is fixed by the diagnosis - this induced hospitals to reduce their 
costs and, in turn, seek cheaper drugs - (3) the separation of hospitals and pharmacies, 
and (4) by promoting generic drugs (1990-). Through these reforms during the 1990s, 
drug expenditure’s percentage of the total medical expenditure decreased to 8% in 2000.  
 
Anekawa [1999][2001] estimated the demand function to check whether physicians’ 
prescription on how much use which drug prices are increasing or decreasing to prices. 
In their demand estimation demand for each drugs is explained by wholesale and 
official retail prices and fixed individual effects. His results show that physicians’ 
prescription policy becomes independent of the drug price when a generic competitor is 
listed in the same market. He found that when generic competitors were introduced, 
demand only depends upon wholesale prices and individual effects. In this case, an 
official retail price reduction does not affect demand, and thus neither sales nor profits 
by the supplier. On the other hand, demand has negative elasticity to the wholesale price, 
and in this way suppliers can secure their sales and profits by competing with generic 
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drugs.  
 
Kondo [2006] conducted an empirical test on the impact of the fixed reimbursement 
policy introduced in 2003. Theoretically, this scheme may induce two opposite results: 
one is good one, namely accomplishing cost efficiency. The other is the downgrade in 
quality of medical care. Kondo [2006] showed two opposite results in different fields. In 
elderly care, the sales price is reduced while the same quality is maintained, but in the 
dialysis service for outpatients, hospitals started to utilize cheap drugs with stronger side 
effects, rather than higher-priced ones with fewer side effects. The latter case implies 
that the quality of service was lower. 
 
1.3 How Do Pharmaceutical Patents and Price Policy Affect 
Consumer Welfare? 
 
In academics, particularly, in the field of development studies, function of 
pharmaceutical patents becomes a controversial issue: should pharmaceuticals be 
patented to private firms or individuals, particularly in developing economies where the 
general public’s ability to afford them is limited? In reality, India refused to provide 
pharmaceutical firms with patent protection until the WTO forced it to join the 
international framework on intellectual property rights, Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in 1996. 
 
One famous story around this problem was the acute conflict over HIV vaccines. Strict 
patent protection limited access to a newly invented drug for patients in Africa, who 
were the largest group suffering from this disease. Only rich patients in the US could 
access this new and effective treatment. Thus, TRIPS also allowed a compulsory 
removal of patent protection for humanitarian relief.  Even for developed economies, 
pharmaceutical patents are new: Germany did not approve patents on drugs until 1968, 
and Italy did not do so until 1978 (Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Jia [2006]). In 1980, there 
were still 50 countries that did not approve patents on pharmaceuticals. 
 
The patent system was originally invented to encourage innovators to transfer their 
inventions to those affected, particularly those in developing economies. The US and 
France were the first countries who were developing economies then, introduced the 
patent system so that they could introduce new technology from the UK, which was the 
most developed economy in the 19th century. On the other hand, the patent system also 
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has a negative effect on developing economies, such as damaging local firms or 
industries by pushing up the operating costs (J. Lanjow, A Series of Lectures on 
“Economic Perspective on Global Patent Law and Pharmaceutical Regulation: R&D 
and Access to New Treatment.” in 2005).  Chaudori,S., Goldberg and Jia [2006] 
estimated how patent protection of pharmaceuticals affects consumer welfare. Their 
simulation test showed that high retail prices and poor availability of drugs in 
developing economies because of patent protection for international pharmaceutical 
firms might reduce consumer welfare. 
 
Lanjouw [2005] analyzed and tested whether patent protection for newly listed drugs 
and a high price monopoly in the international market (not in a local market we 
observed) delayed the general publics’ access to new treatments. The results showed 
that the high international price of a new drug will delay access to the new treatment, 
and the drug price in developed economies has a positive external effect on local prices 
in developing economies. This implies that patent protection in developed economies 
that allows a high price monopoly has an external effect over the pricing in developing 
economies (a negative effect on consumer welfare in developing economies). On the 
other hand, impact of the patent is mixed: it was not clear whether it was negative or 
positive. This result implies that the innovation capacity of pharmaceutical firms in 
developing economies is important for public welfare in those same developing 
economies. 
 
 
2. Model Analysis and Data 
 
In this section, lest us consider how firms will set their prices under two different 
demand properties - Giffen Goods demand and normal demand - and when the 
bargaining powers for setting prices rests with the firms, the suppliers, or hospitals, the 
buyers. By investigating the pricing strategy in equilibrium under different demand and 
bargaining power regimes, we can compare the predicted size of the profits of firms and 
hospitals, and the volume of drugs supplied in society.  
 
2.1 The Statins’ Demand Curve 
 
2.1.1 Data: Statins (or HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors 他汀类) Market 
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Here, we can consider data on the price, quantity and other characteristics in the Statin 
drug market in China, which was compiled by IMS Health. The Statin is a class of drugs 
that lower the cholesterol level in people with, or who are at risk from, cardiovascular 
disease. Statins and Fibrates are the main two competing drugs for lowering cholesterol, 
but Statin have a 70% market share in China – they are sold here in the largest amounts 
in the world as well. In China, the sale of Statins is increasing, which reflects a high 
ratio of high cholesterol or cardiovascular patients in the country. In particular, after the 
SARS outbreak calmed down in 2003, drugs for lowering cholesterol were a booming 
category in China in 2004-2005. 
 
Types of Statins currently on sales are Lovastatin, Simvastatin, Pravastatin, Fluvastatin 
and Atorvastatin, which are listed in the Chinese market in order of appearance. The 
first 4 are on the State Basic Medical Insurance Catalogue, and the government caps 
their retail prices. Patent protections are in effect for Pravastatin, Fluvastatin and 
Atorvastatin. New drug protection was in effect until 2007 for Pravastatin and 
Atorvastatin. Cerivastatin, a statin discovered by Bayer, was withdrawn from the market 
due to risks of serious adverse effects, and 2 Statins, Rousvastatin and Pitavastatin, were 
discovered to overcome the defects. They are not yet listed in China. Table 1 shows the 
details. 
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Table 1: Types of Statins and the Number of Firms in the Market 
 
Derivation Generic Name 
Chinese 
Name 
# of drugs (production document) and 
firms (document holder) 
Global Product Patent 
Holder  Effective Patent
Effective new 
drug 
protection 
(Latest) 
State Basic 
Medical 
Insurance 
Catalogue 
Lovastatin 洛找他汀 51 documents, 36 firms Merck Ｘ Ｘ ○ 
Simvastatin 辛伐他汀 107 documents, 54 firms Merck Ｘ Ｘ ○ 
1st gen. 
Fermented Pravastatin 普伐他汀
14 documents (3 raw drugs), 6 firms 
Bristrol-Myers/Sankyo/Huabei/Haizheng/
Shanghai Xiandai/Shanghai Tianwei 
Bristol Myers/ Sankyo ○  ○ ○ 
1.5 gen: 
Semi-Synthesis Fluvastatin 氟伐他汀
Beijing Novartis (2 drugs) and  
Zhejiang Haizheng (1 raw drugs) 
Novartis ○ Ｘ ○ 
Atorvastatin 阿托伐他汀
6 document (1 raw drugs), 3firms 
Pfizer, Beijing Jialin (Honghui) and Henan 
Tianfang 
Pfizer ○ ○ Ｘ 
2nd gen: 
Synthesis Rosuvastatin 瑞舒伐他汀 Not produced in China AstraZebecca - - Ｘ 
3rd gen. Pitavasatin - Not produced, not on sale in China Kowa - - Ｘ 
(Source) # of production document holders and effective new drug protection was derived from the Database on Local Production Drugs, at China 
Medical Drug Webnet. Information on Effective Patents was obtained from the New Horizon Database/State Basic Medical Insurance Catalogue. 
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2.1.2 Historical Demand Curve in Individual Drugs 
 
What, then, is the relationship between demand quantity and price? We can draw a 
historical demand curve from our data on quantity and price from 1999 to 2006. For 
drugs in the Statin markets, we can see the following properties from these drawings: 
(1) there are three groups in terms of the relationship between quantity and price. One 
group shows that the price slightly decreases as the volume increases (two drugs in 
Atorvastatin, two drugs from Pravastatin). The second group’s price is almost constant 
regardless of volume (one drug in Atorvastatin, two drug from Fluvastatin and 
Simvastatin). The third group’s demand volume increases as the price increases (one 
drug in Pravastatin and Lovastatin). (2) Members of the first group, whose demand 
volume increases as the price decreases, i.e. a normal case of demand, are all the 
patented products of foreign pharmaceutical firm. (3) However, that is not always the 
case as one of the members of the third group, whose demand volume increases as the 
price goes up, is the patented product of a foreign firm, while the others are domestic 
manufacturer’s generic products. 
 
Here, we cannot strongly assert that the demand for drugs in China can be characterized 
whereby demand increases as price increases. However, we can say that a case of 
normal demand, where the demand volume increases as the price goes down, is not 
common in this market either. Furthermore, we miss the interaction between drugs in 
each type’s market or the Statin market as a whole, where there is some product 
differentiation at work. In any case, precise statistical testing is necessary to capture the 
nature of the demand in the Chinese drug market. 
 
We will proceed to formally analyzing how the nature of demand will affect the pricing 
policy of firms and prices at equilibrium by assuming that in the case of “Feeding 
Hospitals with Drugs,” demand increases in relation to price. 
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Figure 1: Demand Curve   
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2.2 Model Prediction for Pricing Strategies 
 
Faced with the unusual demand curve that we have seen above, how do firms set their 
prices? What factors affect firms’ price setting, and what are levels of price and supply 
volume? Here, we take a look at the results of theoretical analysis. We will compare 
firms’ pricing strategies under several conditions within the “Feeding Hospitals with 
Drugs” type of demand: (1) where the price is set to maximize the profits of the hospital 
(buyer), (2) where firms (suppliers) that are competing for quantity set prices in a 
decentralized way, (3) and the same with regard to price competition. Details of the 
reduction of these results are set out in the Appendix. Tables 2 and 3 show a summary 
of the results of our analysis.  
 
Here, we can see the following nature: 
 
(1) When the price set according the monopolizing behavior of a hospital 
(buyer), the price being at equilibrium is an increasing function of the “official 
price cap on the retail price”. Firms’ profits are also increasing the function of 
the official price cap. If prices are set via competition over quantity or price 
among suppliers, the price being at equilibrium and the profit of the firms are 
increasing functions of the marginal costs of suppliers (see Table 1). If the 
former case is an actual mechanism that currently works in China, then retail 
price reduction by the government would seriously damage the firms’ profits. 
 
(2) Volume of drugs supplied also follows a similar course: when equilibrium 
price is set according to a hospital’s monopolistic behavior, the sales volume of 
the drug is an increasing function of the “official price cap on the retail price.” 
On the contrary, if suppliers are competing over setting the prices, then the 
sales volume of the drug is an increasing function of the marginal costs of 
suppliers. Thus, if the former case is an actual mechanism in China, then retail 
price reduction by the government would, again, reduce the production of 
drugs. This is not expected by current policy makers. 
 
Table 2: Prices at Factories and Firms’ Profits by Pricing Strategy 
 
 Demand Type 
Price Setting 
Regime 
Price at Factory Rank Profit of Firm Rank
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1 
“Feeding 
Hospitals with 
Drugs” 
Hospital’s 
monopolized 
pricing  
p= (vmax -Ө)/2 1 (v
max +Ө)( vmax +Ө 
- 2c) /4>0 1 
2 
“Feeding 
Hospitals with 
Drugs” 
Quantity 
competition  
)1)(( ++−= nccp θ 4 
22 )1/()( nc ++− θ
<0 
6 
3 
“Feeding 
Hospitals with 
Drugs” 
Price competition c2 3 2/))(( 122 ccc −+θ  3 
4 
Normal Hospital’s 
monopolized 
pricing  
cp =  3 0 5 
5 
 Normal Quantity 
competition  
)1/()( +−+= nccp ii θ 2 
22 )1/()( nc +−θ
>0 
2 
6 Normal Price competition c2 3 2/))(( 122 ccc −−θ  4 
(Source) Author 
(Note) c1 and c2 in price competition (columns 3 and 6) represent the marginal costs of 
supplier 1 and supplier 2. In the analysis here, supplier 1 is more cost efficient than supplier 2, 
that is, c1 < c2. 
 
Table 3: Price at Patient, Hospital’s Profits, and Supply Volume of Drugs 
 
 
Demand 
Type 
Price 
Setting 
Regime 
Price at 
Patient Hospital’s Profit Rank
Total Supply 
of Drug Rank
1 
“Feeding 
Hospitals 
with Drugs” 
Hospital’s 
monopolized 
pricing  
vmax (vmax +Ө)2/4 1 (Ө + v)/2 3 
2 
“Feeding 
Hospitals 
with Drugs” 
Quantity 
competition  v
max )
1
(
)1(
)( max
+
++−+
+
n
ccv
n
c θθ
3 
)1/()( ncn ++θ
 5 
3 
“Feeding 
Hospitals 
with Drugs” 
Price 
competition v
max  2/))(( 1max2 cvc −+θ  4 )( 2c+θ  4 
4 
Normal Hospital’s 
monopolized 
pricing  
vmax (Ѳ - c) ( vmax - c) 2 Ѳ – c 1 
5 
Normal Quantity 
competition  v
max )
1
(
)1(
)( max
+
−−−+
+
n
ccv
n
c θθ  6 )1/()( ncn i +−θ
 
2 
6 Normal Price competition v
max  2/))(( 1max2 cvc −−θ  5 )( 2c−θ  1 
(Source) Author 
 
We also analyzed the impact of non-price (quality) competition on the pricing and 
volume of drug sales in the Appendix. The results show that  when the price in 
equilibrium is set by monopolistic hospitals, the prices at factories are an increasing 
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function of the “official retail price cap” for all drugs listed in the same market. In other 
words, for patented drugs and generics of the same drug, prices move in an interacted 
way, even though suppliers are not competing on price.  
 
 
3.  Case Study 
 
3.1 Pricing Policies of Firms That Were Interviewed 
 
In order to understand what factors actually affect firms’ price setting behavior, we 
conducted a series of interviews with firms in May and June of 2007. Decisions 
regarding the choice of which drugs to list, as well as pricing and related investments 
are all important issues for pharmaceutical management.  The final outcome of all 
these considerations will be the company’s price setting strategy. In this section, we 
simply summarize the information about (1) who has the power to decide which drugs 
to list, and (2) what the factors are that determine price setting. We were able to 
interview members of the decision makers in each of the firms, and they were able to 
explain what factors actually matter with regard to decision-making. 
 
Table 4: Title of Interviewees 
 
 Firms  Title of Interviewees 
1 A Head of Intellectual Property 
2 B CEO, Chief Scientist 
3 C Head of Research and Development  
4 D General Manager 
5 E General manager 
6 F General Manager 
7 G Chairman  
8 H Secretary of GM cum Head of Development Planning
9 I Chairman, General Manager 
10 J General Manager  
11 K Vice General Manager 
12 L Vice General Manager 
(Source) Author 
 
In Table 5, we have summarized the nature of the listed drugs by patent, new drug, 
generics, original innovations, etc. Although these statistics is still imperfect and need to 
be elaborated on, we can still see some characteristics present. (1) The number of listed 
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patented drugs is small for all the firms, regardless of the size of their sales. (2) The 
number of drugs documented as new drugs and generics is larger than that of patented 
drugs. (3) The number of original drugs does not show a systematic difference between 
sales. However, these original drugs seem to have duplicated meanings: some firms 
responded with the number of drugs that they really developed, and also have patents 
for. Others pointed out the drugs that were originally developed by some foreign 
pharmaceuticals, but which they developed themselves based on published information, 
as the first generics in China. This follows the criteria of pricing formula of the “retail 
price cap” by the SDRC. 
 
To summarize, most of drugs that were listed by the interviewed firms are not patented. 
But they are either protected by new drug protection or favored by official pricing.  
New drug documents are often issued to several drugs, and a drug documented as a 
“new drug” does not necessarily means there is a perfect monopoly over the market, but 
rather they can enjoy an oligopolistic environment. The original drug can enjoy the 
effect of a higher official retail price cap. Thus, most of drugs listed by the interviewed 
firms enjoy some favorable terms in China’s official pricing policy, but not patent 
protection. 
  
Table 5: Structure of Listed Products 
 
  Sales in 2006 (bil. RMB) Patented Drug New Drug Documents Generics
Original 
Drugs 
Listed on 
Drug 
Catalogue 
OTC
1 E 50 1 5 0 6 3 - 
2 L 4.05 1 7,8 many 4,5 many 0 
3 I 3.59 0 6 33 0 - - 
4 H 2.7 12  (50 applied) 
23 (Class2) + 32 
(Class4) 51 - - - 
5 C 2.69 
0 product 
patents. A few 
process patents 
About 20 - 1 TCM - - 
6 A 2.4 
Applications 
688; approved 
102 
0 1,2 1 0 - 
7 B 1.5 
Applied 69-70, 
domestic 7, 
international  
Numerous 1,2 
Self 
innovated
40 
 two thirds one tenth
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8 F 1.4 0 110 (20-30 including APIs) - - 40 - 
9 J 1 8,9 0 
All 
western 
drugs are 
generics
8,9 2,3 1(flu drug)
10 G 0.85 6 ? - 6 - - 
11 K 0.28 3 About 20  0  80-90
12 D 0.2 0  0 All 0 - - 
(Source) Author 
 
Some firms offered a detailed story on their pricing strategies. Our findings are as 
follows: 
 
(1) The price is set to cover R&D, including failed research. This implies that 
current price setting can cover fixed costs, and thus the current price level 
could be higher than the marginal costs. 
(2) Foreign pharmaceuticals’ prices are used as a reference, and domestic 
makers will set a price that is lower than them, as the buyer will not purchase a 
domestic drug if its price is higher. 
(3) Firms prefer to set as high prices that the institutions allow as possible: a 
higher price will not reduce the demand for most drugs. 
(4) However, price elasticity is very high for some drugs, lower prices can 
induces huge demand to increase as in the case of firm F.   
 
Table 6: Pricing Policy and its Formula 
 
 Firms  Pricing Policy  
6 F 
In order to take over your foreign rivals’ market share, set prices as low as 1/6 of 
your competition’s. You can expect large volumes, and so you can set lower 
prices. the price is set to cover the cost of any failed R&D. 
11 K 
Set a price lower than foreign firms’ products by considering (1) cost, (2) market 
volume, and (3) rivalry. 
12 L 
First, refer to the official price, and try to get a sole price. Then, study the 
market to decided whether to follow the "high price principle" or "low price 
principle." 
(Source) Author 
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3.2: Voices in the Field on Pricing 
 
In the interviews with pharmaceuticals, there were many opinions on pricing policy. 
z Aggressive price reduction is not effective at reducing the retail market drug price 
for the patient, and hurts pharmaceuticals regarding investing in R&D and new 
drugs. 
z Production documents are now issued by each firm and are not permitted to be 
transferred even within a corporate group. This does not allow big corporations to 
utilize their economies of scale and scope, and this management philosophy is 
advantageous towards small firms.  
 
On auctions: 
z The transactions of hospital and pharmaceuticals should be liberalized, and should 
not be controlled by the central tendering auctions. 
z The auction method is too complicated, and there is no transparent process. 
z The rules of auctions are not transparent, particularly the negotiation process.  
z Seeing the results of auctions, we have the impression that there was some 
manipulation against the auction organizer, particularly by small and notorious 
pharmaceutical firms.  
z Categorization by quality is irrational: for drugs priced according to market 
adjustment, there are (1) patented drugs, (2) original drugs without patents any 
more, (3) GMP-licensed generic drugs. The second category is irrational, as the 
patent has already expired but the protection is still effective.  
 
On the retail price cap: 
z Aggressive price reductions by the SDRC are irrational as the manufacturers cannot 
survive. 
z Price regulations should be more simple: just set a “reimbursement price on the 
medical insurance drug catalogues.” Other price regulations are ineffective and just 
duplicate one another. 
 
 
4. Analysis of the Impacts of Policies 
 
Based on the above, we have attempted to analyze the impact of such government 
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policies as the retail price cap on official pricing, patent and new drug protection, and 
the centralized tendering scheme by auction. 
 
4.1 Maximum Retail Price  
 
As we saw in Part I, there is price regulation in China’s pharmaceutical industry – the 
State Development and Reform Committee (SDRC) sets a price cap over drugs listed on 
the State Basic Medical Insurance Drug Catalogue. In 2006, the SDRC aggressively 
reduced this official price cap and completed price reductions on around 1500 kinds of 
drugs until March 2007. Several firms complained about this policy, and asked for a 
rational and accountable pricing mechanism. 
 
According to our model analysis on the price setting strategy above, firms’ price setting 
strategies are a function of retail prices. Hospitals set their retail prices as high as 
possible, and thus the retail price cap substantially affects hospitals’ retail prices and the 
firms’ price setting at the factories. We can confirm this in the Statin market data. Figure 
7 shows the movement of the official retail price and market prices of Pravachor, a 
product of Bristol Myers-Squibb, a British pharmaceutical, in a Pravastatin market. 
Pravastatin is listed on the State Basic Medial Insurance Drug Catalogue, and Bristol 
Myers Squibb holds global market exclusivity except in Japan, where an innovator 
Sankyo holds market exclusivity. 
 
In Figure 71, we can observe that market prices at the patient level and at the factory are 
both decreasing gradually, but basically follow the official price cap, although a 
statistical test is necessary to more clearly confirm this. What is interesting is that 
following a reduction of the official retail price cap in 2006, not only the retail price set 
by the hospital, but also the price at the factory set by the firms, decreased by 
maintaining almost the same level of margins. This development supports our 
hypothesis on the price setting mechanism: that hospitals set a monopolized price, and 
firms accept this level.  Thus, firms’ profits depend heavily on the official price margin, 
and as a result they are opposed to this policy.  
 
                                                 
1 In IMS Health data, the price that was actually surveyed is the price at the trading company. The 
price at the factory and price at the patient level are derived by multiplying their “expanding 
coefficient.” Thus, these prices virtually move together by this definition. But here, we show these 
two prices together so that we can see the relationship between them and the official retail price cap.  
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Figure 2: Official Retail Price Cap: Pravastatin, Bristol Myers-Squibb 
o, is the reduction of the official retail price policy good for social welfare? If we 
his result – the reduced availability of drugs – can be avoided if the government knows 
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S
define social welfare as consisting not only of low prices, but also of the availability of 
drugs, we must also care about whether firms can continue to operate in the market as 
well as the benefits consumers see from low prices. If the official price reduction is too 
large, so hospitals offer drugs at a price lower than the firm’s marginal costs, the firm 
will halt production, and subsequently the availability of the drugs will decrease. This is 
what domestic pharmaceuticals are currently complaining at.  
 
T
accurately the exact marginal costs for each drug.  The SDRC seems be trying their 
best to ascertain this information and have visited many firms and ordered them to 
disclose their information on production costs2. But the information on the costs is 
asymmetrical between firms and the regulatory agent by nature, and the cost of 
disclosing this information is very high. As a result, some irrational setting on official 
prices are happening: for example, firms will set a price that covers not only their 
production costs but also their R&D cost, and sometimes they may include expenditure 
on failed R&D.  However, the SDRC only considers R&D cost for succeeded case. 
Pricing is a key element in a firm’s corporate strategy, and so it is not reasonable for a 
regulatory agent to directly control this variable.  
 
 
2 Interviews with pharmaceutical firms in May and June, 2007. 
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You can expect to allow firms to keep operating by change the environments of both 
.2   “Patents” and “New Drug Protection”  
atent protection was motivated to provide a certain profit those who have invested a 
able 1 shows the number of production document holders, that is the number of firms 
firms and the hospitals. If we can change hospital’s demand to a normal property, that is, 
where the hospital prefers a lower priced drug of the same quality, then hospital will 
offer the buyer the minimum price that firms can accept, which is equal to their 
marginal costs, and this allows the firms to keep operating. The regulatory agent then 
does not have to make efforts to acquire cost information. If demand becomes normal, 
then the official retail price reduction only affects the hospitals’ profits, and does not 
affect firms’ decisions to enter the market. In this way we can achieve both a “lower 
price” and “high availability of drugs”. Of course, the cost of changing a hospital’s 
demand to normal in not nothing, but includes public subsidies to hospitals or equity 
investment, etc.. It is important to study which cost is higher between a sufficient 
subsidy that changes a hospital’s revenue structure and the cost of a search to get firms 
to disclose their rational costs. This author presumes that the latter is far higher, 
particularly taking into consideration the side effect that intervention on pricing has on 
the incentive to invest in R &D.  Furthermore, we must note that firms’ prices and 
profits might be suppressed to the marginal costs, and that they have lost rent that they 
enjoyed during the “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs” type demand.  
 
4
 
P
massive amount on the discovery of new drugs with innovators in exchange for 
disclosing their invention. The power of that protection is evaluated by the size of 
benefit from market exclusivity that reduces pressure in competition. 
 
T
that have entered the market. Here, we can see that (1) the number of firms who 
embarked on a drug whose patent protection has expired is far larger than those whose 
patent or new drug protection is effective: Lovastatin, which is the first of the Statin 
drugs, and Simvastatin, whose patents have expired already, have respectively 36 and 
54 suppliers with production documents. This number is far beyond those who are still 
protected by patents or new drug protection, such as Pravastatin, Fluvastatin and 
Atorvastatin: their number of their suppliers is respectively 6, 3 and 3.  This implies 
that once market exclusivity protection is removed, massive (domestic) firms have 
entered into each drug market. This implies that they can make a profit, even with a 
substantial number of rivals. This is inconsistent with the result of the model analysis on 
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decentralized competition, which predicts that decentralized competition in quantity 
leads to a halt in production in market. It seems that a model of decentralized 
competition faced with Giffen Goods market is not suitable for use in understanding the 
Chinese pharmaceutical market. 
 
Table 7 shows the number of drugs and firms in a market, and the number of firms 
able 7: Market Exclusivity Protection and the Number of Firms in the 
 
 New Drug Documents Patents 
protected by new drug documents or patents. The number of drugs in the market is 
clearly different between a group of Lovastatin and Simvastatin and others. The former 
group has said that their substantial (product) patents have expired, but a number of 
patents confirmed in the New Horizon Database shows no big difference. On the 
contrary, the number of effective new drug documents shows a correlation to the 
number of drugs in the market. Thus the there are zero effective new drug documents 
for a group of Lovastatin and Simvastatin, a substantial “patent-expired” group. New 
drug documents for Pravastatin and Atorvastatin are effective, and the number of drugs 
and firms are small. In the Fluvastatin market, no firm holds an effective new drug 
document. Novartis, a global product patent holder, made a component patent 
application in 2001.3 IMS health data reported sales of Fluvastatin only by Novaritis. 
Patent protection could be effective in this case.  
 
T
Statin Market 
# of  
(
# of 
issued* 
Firms # of p
Ea
a  Firms 
drug 
firms) NDD 
# of new drug 
docs currently 
effective atents 
rliest 
patent 
pplied for
in: 
 
Lovastatin 51 (36) - 16 198 17 Merck etc.0 0 9/7/
Simvastatin 107 (54) 17  0 - 14 1989/7/17 Merck etc.
Pravastatin 14 (6) 11  
9 docs (3 
raw  
Xiandai, 
12 1989/3/31 
Bristol 
M i
 materials),
5 firms until 
2007.1.17or 
2008.1.23 
Huabei, 
Haizheng, 
Tianwei, 
Sankyo 
yers-Squ
bb, Sankyo
Fluvastatin 3 (2) 0 2  1989/3/31 
Pfizer, 
0 - 
Nova 
Atorvastatin 6 (3) 3  3 doc, 1 firm Pfizer 10 1996/7/8 Pfizer 
                                                 
3 State Intellectual Property Office website, 
http://app.sipo.gov.cn:8080/sipo/enzljs/hyjs-yx.jsp?recid=01807914 
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u (W antil 2007.9.28 arner-L
mbert) 
(Note) *The number of new drug to 5), that can be confirmed in the Dat n 
 
ow, then, does this market protection affect prices in a market? Take a look at the 
igure 3: Patent and New Drug Protection: Atrovastatin, Pfizer 
g Jialin 
documents (class 1 abase o
Local Production Drugs at China Medical Drug Webnet in 2007 July. 
 
H
movements of price and market protection in the Atorvastatin market. In this market, 
Pfizer holds both new drug protection and patent protection. Beijing Jialin, a local firm, 
is also operating in this market. Figure 3 shows the price development of Pfizer 
products, which shows that the price level is high but it kept almost at the same level 
since listing. On the other hand, Figure 4 shows the price of Jialin’s products. This 
shows that the price has fallen at a relatively high speed.  In addition to market 
protection by new drug documents and patents, there is another factor: the former has 
brand power, the latter does not.  We cannot say exactly what factors affect this 
difference in price movement here, but we can say that the institution of market 
exclusivity works in this case. 
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Figure 4: No Patent or New Drug Protection: Atrovastatin, Beijin
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4.3 The Impact of Auctions 
 
The analyses above focus on a one-to-one transaction between hospitals and firms. 
Auctions, where the buyer invites supplier to bid, are a form of transaction where more 
than one supplier competes against each other. What will happen when the auction is 
introduced, and where competition between suppliers evolves? If we do not care about 
any disclosure of quality, an auction generates a similar result to a decentralized 
competition case mentioned earlier in this chapter. If buyer demand is normal, the price 
decreases when the number of competitors increases, but above cost. If the demand 
follows the model of “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs”, the price will be suppressed to be 
lower than the costs, and thus the firm cannot enter the market. So, the supply of drugs 
might stop if an auction is introduced without adjusting the nature of demand to prefer a 
high-priced drug.  
 
Contract theory can be sued to study the impact of an auction as follows: if the contract 
between buyers and firms specifies the disclosure of the quality of products and requires 
the incentive that the supplier will see higher profits if they disclose true information, 
then the higher quality supplier will be contracted with a higher transaction price than 
lower quality firms under normal demand. Higher quality firms will be able to acquire a 
rent by disclosing information on their own quality. This is called information rent 
according to the theory. The introduction of competition by means of an auction will not 
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change this quality level, but can suppress this information rent. 
 
4.4 Pricing Policy and Innovation 
 
So, how does the pricing policy affect innovation in pharmaceutical firms? The pricing 
policy seriously affects a firm’s profits, which is an important source of financing for 
research and development. Thus, it is not beneficial to innovation to suppress a firm’s 
profit so much that it becomes negative.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the impact on price and profits of manufacturers by price 
setting regimes: for firms, Regime 1 is the best. Under Regime 1, the hospital sets a 
monopolized policy when demand is increasing respective to price, and thus the profits 
of the firm are largest as their sales price is the highest.  
 
4.5 Summary: normalization of demand should be the first  
 
So far, we have examined the current phenomena in the Chinese pharmaceutical 
industry. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of the model analysis. Here, we can see 
that:  
(1) as long as a hospital or physician has bargaining power with the patient 
over the retail price, the retail price of a drug will be set as high as possible. 
Competition between hospitals or physicians, or other schemes to promote a reduction 
in the sales price by the hospital, is necessary to resolve the problem of a “high drug 
price’ which is a important target of the current administration. Competition or auctions 
among firms cannot reduce the retail drug price.  
(2) We can compare the size of hospital profits. If the current state of 
transactions between hospitals and pharmaceutical firms can be assumed to be that the 
hospital price monopolizes their profit and demand is increasing the price at factories, 
the profits of hospitals are maximized in the four regimes we studied here.  
(3) Total drug supply may represent the size of social welfare in the 
pharmaceutical industry. This should be also an important policy target for China, and 
indeed for most developing economies. The model analyses show that the total supply 
of drugs is larger when a hospital’s demand is normal. From this conclusion, it is 
desirable for policy makers to change hospitals’ demand so that it is decreasing in order 
to accomplish a secure and sufficient supply of drugs for society. 
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Appendix Model Analysis on Price Setting Behavior 
 
A.1 Model 1: Decentralized price setting leads to a halt in production   
 
First, we will see what will happen when firms in competition in a decentralized manner 
are setting prices for hospitals. We will see what will happen when firms compete in 
quantity and price under demand characterized as “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs”. If 
the price at the factory is set in a decentralized way, in a first model analysis, we will 
see how competition among firms affects the price, production volume and both the 
firm’s and hospital’s profits.  
 
A.1.1 Competition in quantity under normal and “Feeding Hospitals with 
Drugs” type demand 
 
The nature of competitions in quantity and price were basic cases in industrial 
organization textbooks. We also first look at quantitative competition and then price 
competition under “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs” demand. First, as a reference, we 
take a look at the normal goods market, where demand is decreasing to price: D= Ө- p. 
D is a total volume of supplied goods by n firms, .  ∑
≠
+=
n
ij
ji ddD
A firm i will decide how much to supply their product so as to maximize their profit as 
described before. As a result, the price in the market is determined following the 
demand curve above.  
  
      Max   Πi (di, dj ) = di (p - ci )  
           di    
subject to:  p (D ) = Ө - D 
Then, the first order condition to maximize firm’s profit is as follows: 
        iiii cDDdd −−′−=∂Π∂ θ ii cDd −−−= θ  = 0 
For simplicity, by assuming that production volumes are symmetrical among firms in 
the market, that is, D=ndi, we can get 0=−−− iii cnddθ . 
  
Then, )1/()( ncd ii +−= θ  
    )1/()()1/()( +−+=+−−=−= nccncnndp iii θθθθ . 
 
 80
Each firm’s profit is, 
                Πi = >0. 22 )1/()()( nccpd iii +−=− θ
The hospital’s profit becomes,  
ΠH = )
1
(
)1(
)()( +
−−−+
+=−
n
ccv
n
cpvd i
θθ .  
 
As profit is increasing in relation to retail price v, thus the hospital will set the retail 
price as high as possible, 
v=vmax. 
 
The firm can earn a positive profit here.  In a normal goods market, (1) the firm sets 
the price based on the cost and number of rivals. The retail price of drugs sold by the 
hospital to patient does not affect firms’ pricing of firms. (2) The firm’s profits are 
positive, though it gets small as the number of rivals increases.   
 
Next, take a look at what will happen when the hospital’s demand is increasing in 
relation to price, D= Ө+ p, which is the “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs”-type demand 
here.  A firm i will solve the following problem: 
        Max   Πi (di, dj ) = di (p - ci )  
             di    
subject to:  p (D ) = -Ө + D4.  
By similar calculation to above, we can get,  
)1/()( ncd i ++= θ  and )1/()( ncnD ++= θ  
    )1)(()1/()( ++−=+++−=+−= nccnncndp θθθθ . 
Here, we find that the firm’s profits become negative, as the price is lower than the cost, 
                Πi = <0,  22 )1/()()( nccpd i ++−=− θ
The hospital’s profit becomes,  
                                                 
4 The profit of i, Πi  will be maximized if the di satisfies the first order condition of Πi . Πi (di, 
dj ) can be rewritten as follows: Πi (di, dj ) = di (p - ci ) =  di (-Ө + D)-  ci di .Then, the first order 
condition for maximizing profit is: iiii cDDdd −+′+=∂Π∂ θ- = 0. We again assume that each 
firms’ production volume is symmetrical among firms in the market, that is, D=ndi, we can get, 
0=−++− iii cnddθ . 
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ΠH = )
1
(
)1(
)()( +
++−+
+=−
n
ccv
n
cpvd i
θθ >0,  
Thus hospital will set the retail price as high as possible, 
v=vmax. 
In a market with the “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs” type of demand, (1) the firm 
cannot make a profit when supply volumes are determined in a decentralized way. This 
is in contrast to a case of competition under normal demand, or a case where the 
hospital has monopolistic power, as we will see below. We can expect no firm to enter a 
market where demand is not normal and firms are competing against each other in a 
decentralized way. (2) As the number of firms in competition increase, prices at 
factories get lower, but the supply of drugs increases. Thus, if patent or new drug 
protection is effectively enforced, then the number of firms entering is restricted, and 
the price that the firm sets will be able to remain higher, but the production volume will 
be suppressed. 
 
A.2.2 Competition in Price  
 
If the firms compete in price, they should not have a deficit, but the price is lowered to 
level of marginal costs.  
 
Suppose two firms (Firms 1 and 2) with constant marginal costs are competing in a 
market. We assume that the level of marginal costs are different, c1<c2, and all the 
products are homogenous. Usually, lower marginal cost firms are more efficient, as they 
can produce the same products at lower costs. The firms face a demand curve D(p) （=
θ+ｐ）, and each firm decides their (private) price pi. If demand is of the Giffen Goods 
type, or “Feeding Hospitals with Drugs” type, Firm 1 or 2 will face the following 
demand curve. 
 
                                Giffen Goods demand    Normal demand  
  di(pi, p-i)  = D(pi)   if pi>p-i               if pi<p-i 
                                 = D(p)/2  if pi=p-i                      if pi=p-i   
                 =  0     if pi<p-i                      if pi>p-i 
 
Consider that Firm1 will set price p1=c2, then Firm 2 will also set p2=c2.  In this case, 
Firm 1 and Firm 2 will produce D(c2)/2 respectively. The profits for Firm 1 and Firm 2 
will become D(c2)(c2-c1)/2 >0 and zero. For Firm 1, if they set price c1, then they will 
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lose their profits, so they will not change strategy. For Firm 2, by setting price c1, their 
profit stays at the same level as zero. Thus, Firm 2 has no incentive to change its 
strategy. Thus, the first case is equilibrium.  
 
Here the price, production volume and profit of the firm sector and hospital are: 
p*=c2, D*=θ+c2 , Π
*
f =(θ+c2)(c2-c1)/2, Π*H =(θ+c2)(v-c2). 
Interestingly, when demand is normal, and price in equilibrium stays as c2, the total 
demand volume will change to θ- c2. Thus, if firms in the drug market in China set the 
price independently and compete in price, prices at factory are set to the marginal cost 
of a less efficient firm. As firms in a market faces with the same price, anyway, more 
efficient firms get rent here5.  
 
Figure 2: Production and Profit matrix in the Price Competition Game 
 
Production Volume 
 
  Firm2 
 c1 c2
c1 (D(c1)/2, D(c1)/2) (0, D(c2)) Firm1 
c2 (D(c2), 0) (D(c2)/2, D(c2)/2) 
 
Profit  
  Firm2 
 c1 c2
c1 (0, D(c1)(c1-c2)/2<0) (0, 0 ) Firm1 
c2 (D(c2)(c2-c1)>0, 0) (D(c2)(c2-c1)/2>0, 0) 
(Note) (Outcome of Firm 1, Outcome of Firm2) 
 
The quantity competition model shows that no firm will enter a market with a Giffen 
Good demand, as they lose money. Table 1 shows that a huge number of firms entered 
the markets, and thus firms are not competing on quantity. The price competition model 
                                                 
5 However, if the quality of products is not sufficiently observable for buyers, and difference of 
the marginal cost indicates a cost reduction by quality reduction, manufacturers of poor quality 
products secure a rent.  
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indicates that their prices at the factory in the drug market are a function of the marginal 
cost. We compare the movement of price in the body of this chapter. 
 
A.2 Model 2: Monopolistic Hospital Sets the Price   
 
According to the quantity competition model, decentralized competition in quantity may 
lead to a negative profit for a firm and they will exit the market. However, in reality, 
several firms are operating in the market, and a shortage of drugs is hardly heard of in 
China. On the other hand, if firms are competing in price, equilibrium prices are 
function of marginal cost. Theoretically speaking, the government’s pricing policy does 
not affect firm’s pricing and profit. However, so many firms are complaining at the 
government’s official price reduction. How is the price set in reality? An alternative 
hypothesis on the pricing mechanism is that buyer has monopolistic bargaining power, 
offering a price such that the buyer can maximize their profits and the supplier can 
accept this, and thus the supplier accepts the price. 
 
We will consider the model of a transaction between a hospital (H) and pharmaceutical 
firm (P). We assume that the hospital has 100 % bargaining power and thus can set the 
price of purchasing from the pharmaceutical firms. The hospital will set the purchasing 
price to maximize their profit, ΠH=d (v- p), where d is the transaction volume of the 
drug, v is the retail price of the drug from the hospital to the patient, whereas p is the 
purchasing price from the pharmaceutical firms by the hospital. Furthermore, in China’s 
pharmaceutical industry, the SDRC has set the maximum price as vmax. Here we assume 
that the consumer, the patient, benefits more as the retail price is lowered. Furthermore, 
the transaction will not take place if the pharmaceutical firms do not accept the 
transaction offer. We assume that pharmaceutical firms will take this offer as long as 
their profit is not less than zero, that is, d(p - c)≧0, c is the marginal cost of production 
to guarantee a certain level of quality. 
 
A.2.1 The Normal Goods Market 
 
When hospital demand is normal, that is the hospital prefers a cheaper price for the 
same quality goods, demand for the drug decreases in relation to the price. Here, we 
describe this demand nature as follows: d = Ѳ– p. Thus, the hospital will solve the 
following problem so as to maximize their profit.   
 Max   ΠH = (Ѳ - p) ( v - p) 
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        p,v   
subject to:   vmax ≧v  
                       d(p - c)≧0.  
 
In this setting, there is no unique solution to maximize the hospital’s profit, but the 
solution is get at the maximum of v and minimum of p within a range p≦(Ѳ + v) /26 . 
Thus, the transaction price between the hospital and pharmaceutical industry, and the 
retail price between the patient and hospital, and production volume of drugs in 
equilibrium are: 
p*=c, v*= vmax, , d*=Ѳ– c.  
 
Here, profits of the hospital and firms are: 
ΠH *= (Ѳ - c) ( vmax - c), and ΠF *= 0 . 
 
In this result, we can see the following properties: (1) the transaction price between the 
hospital and pharmaceuticals is set at the minimum level of cost for the firms7. Here, no 
rent is left for the pharmaceutical firms and their profit is independent of the maximum 
retail official price. Thus, a reduction of the official price does not affect the profit of the 
pharmaceutical firm, so they are neutral regarding the retail price reduction if hospital’s 
drug demand is normal. But its profit is smaller than the case under a “Feeding 
Hospitals with Drugs” scenario, as we see below. (2) The hospital will set the retail 
price as high as the retail price cap permits. The retail price cap set by the government is 
effective in terms of securing a consumer’s welfare by keeping the retail price lower, 
rather than as high as possible, when the hospital has monopolistic power over pricing.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Normal goods demand.                 
                                                 
6 As the hospital profit function is concave to p, or the second derivative is positive, the first order 
condition of the profit is a minimizer of the profit. p will not take the value larger than (Ѳ + v) /2 as 
it c cannot be larger than  (Ѳ + v) /2, as c<Ө, c<v. 
7 Here, we assume that marginal costs among firms are identical, different from the price 
competition model above. 
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c                             Supply :p=c.     
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A.2.2  “Feeding Hospital with Drug” or Giffen goods market. 
Next, we will consider a case when demand is increasing to price, or “Feeding Hospital 
with Drug” type demand. We just replace a setting on demand with d = Ө + p. Here, 
Hospital under the “Feeding Hospital with Drug” will solve the following problem: 
    Max   ΠH = (Ө + p)( v – p)  
         p,v,    
subject to:   vmax ≧v  
                       d(p - c)≧0.  
Here, there exist an unique solution to maximize hospital’s profit: p= (v- Ө)/2if 
(v-Ө)/2≧c  which maximizes the marginal revenue of hospital. v = vmax. Thus, 
transaction price between hospital and pharmaceutical industry and production volume 
in equilibrium are  
p*= (vmax -Ө)/2, v*= vmax, , d*= (Ө + v)/2 .  
Profits of hospital and firms at equilibrium are,  
ΠH = (vmax +Ө)2/4, and ΠF*= (vmax +Ө)( vmax +Ө - 2c) /4.  
 A result here have following properties: (1) hospital’s price setting will 
generate a rent of the pharmaceutical firms, as transaction price p is higher than 
marginal cost of firms. Pharmaceutical firms can share rent of transaction, in contrast to 
a case under a normal demand when their profit are zero. The hospitals and firms share 
rent from high retail price, not constrained to a demand of hospital, as we can see in 
Figure 2. (2) This transaction price p is a function of retail price v, thus reduction of 
official retail price reduced profit of the pharmaceutical firms. Therefore, firms are very 
negative to the policy.  (3) Hospital will set retail price as much as high that retail price 
cap permits. The retail price cap set by the government is effective, again, in terms of 
securing a certain consumer’s welfare by keeping the retail price restraining lower than 
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highest as possible when hospital has monopolistic power in setting price.  
 
Figure 2:  Feeding Hospital with Drug.                  
P                                  
      v 
                           Demand d=Ө+p 
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Let us compare results on different pricing policies under (1) decentralized 
price competition (2) contract with monopolistic hospital in both (3) normal and (4) 
Giffen goods demand market.  In Figure 3, we compare pairs of production volume 
and prices for a case when hospital has 100 per cent bargaining power (Point A), and the 
other case is price competition (Point B). When firm compete in price in a decentralized 
way, revenue of firm is smaller than cost of production, thus firm will stop and exit from 
the market.  
This difference mainly comes from that of allocation of decision power: in the 
former case, hospital, buyer has a monopolistic power to decide volume and price, there 
is no influence of interaction between suppliers. On the other hand, in the latter case, 
decision right on entry of market and production was given to the firms, competitive 
interaction among supplier drastically shrinks production volume, and price is also 
lowered due to special feature of demand “Feeding Hospital with Drug,” thus, supplier 
cannot help stopping production. It is natural that if number of firms is large, price and 
production will shrink further, though the model analysis indicates that even only 1 
supplier exists in the market, its revenue is smaller than cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Decentralized decision under Feeding Hospital with Drug.                  
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A.3 Model 3:  Product differentiation under “Feeding Hospital with Drug” 
In actual world in the pharmaceutical industry in China, several firms coexist in a 
market; e.g., foreign R&D base pharmaceuticals and domestic manufacturers, under 
hospital’s monopolistic power. If only price is the factor that determines that market 
demand, and higher price is preferred to lower one by buyer, monopoly by the highest 
price supply appears. It is presumable that product differentiation may exist here; 
quality is also an important factor to determine demand. 
 
Here, we consider a case when the buyer values quality of goods, s, as well as price p. 
We again assume that buyer prefers higher price (Utility of buyer is higher for higher 
price of drugs).  
   ui  = Өi sj + pj >0   Buy Drug j with quality sj and price pj. 
          =  0      Not buy. 
When we take quality into consideration, we can see that several products with 
different price coexist in the market, as we experiences in actual life. We consider a case 
that there are two buyers: Buyer 1 values higher price for their drug price margin, but do 
not much care about quality. On the other hand, Buyer 2 values both high quality for 
medical reason and high price for high drug price margin. There are also 2 kinds of 
products: DrugH is high quality and high price, and DrugL is low quality and high price. 
In this case, Buyer 2 will definitely buy high-quality-high price drug. However, Buyer 1, 
who cares less about quality will buy drug under some condition, may buy DrugL if 
price is high enough to compensate low evaluation to quality (See Figure 4).   
 
 
 Demand for each drug will become as follows: Buyer will buy drug if its utility 
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Өi sj + pj is higher than zero. In the other word, if Өi≧ - pj/sj is hold, that is, hospital j 
whose type index or a taste on price and quality Өi is larger than a price-quality ratio, - 
pj/sj of Drug j will buy this drug. If we know a ratio of those whose type index is larger 
than a price-quality ratio of Goods j, we can know size of demand for Goods j by 
multiplying this ratio to total sales of the market interested. We assume that type Өi is 
distributed uniformly between 0 to 18, one hospital buy one unit of drug and total 
number of hospital as D. 
 Here, we have size of demand for drug j in the total population become 
D{ 1-(- pj/sj)}9.     
 When demand for a high quality, Drug H, and a low quality Drug L coexist in a 
market, ratio of demand for these two drugs in a market can be described following in a 
way above. Demand for two drug in one drug market coexist when Өi sH + pH> Өi sL + 
pL>0. In the other word, a high quality drug H and is demanded by a type group who are 
in Өi≧ - (pH- pL)/(sH - sL ), lower type of drug is demanded by a type group within - 
(pH- pL) /(sH - sL )≧Өi≧-pL/sL . Here, demand for drug H and drug L become; 
  dH = D{ 1- (pH- pL )/(sL - sH ) }= D{(pH- pL) +∆s}/∆s,     Demand for Drug H,  
       dL= D{ - (pH- pL)/(sL- sH ) - (-pL/sL )}=D(pLsH-sLpH)/sL∆s, Demand for Drug L.  
     where ∆s≡sH- sL.  
Total volume of this drug in this market is,   
         dH+dL= D(sL + pL)/sL. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Different quality goods coexist in a market under “Feeding Hospital with 
                                                 
8 We define s as quality index in a range of [-∞, -p], then type index is distributed in 0≦ Өi≦1 and 
ӨI is increasing to quality index s. For simplicity to derive solution in this theoretical model, we 
assume type index ӨI is distributed uniformly. In empirical investigation, this could be a restrictive 
assumption. In empirics, logistic function, or logit model, is often employed to describe distribution 
of preference or tasted of buyers.  
9 Type index of those who will buy drug j ranges -pj/sj≦Өi≦1. Ratio of population whose taste type 
is larger than -pj/sj, 1-F(-pj/sj), F(･) is a cumulative density function of type index Ө. We assumed the 
type index is distributed uniformly, this ratio of population 1-F(-pj/sj)= 1-(-pj/sj). Total demand for 
drug j is derived by multiplying this ratio to total population N.  
 89
Drug.” 
 P          dH+dL= D(sL + pL)/sL  
  
          Demand for Drug H               
  -sL                              dL= D(pLsH-sLpH)/sL∆s  
 
Demand for Drug L  
    
 
                       D 
 
The hospital, a monopolistic buyer we assume again, will solve the following problems 
and determine prices to purchase10. 
 For drug H,  
     Max   ΠH = D{ 1- (pH- pL )/(sH - sL) }( vH – pH)  
                 p,v,    
subject to:    maxHv ≧v   H
                               d(pH - cH)≧0. 
 
        For drug L,   
     Max   ΠH = D{ - (pH- pL )/(sH - sL )-(-pL/sL) }( vH – pH)  
                 p,v,    
subject to    maxLv ≧v   L
                               d(pL - cL)≧0. 
 
 Prices to maximize the profits of the hospitals11 are,  
pH = {vH + pL -(sH -sL) }/2, 
 pL = {vL + pH sL /sH} }/2. 
 
For suppliers, it is rational to accept the prices offered by the hospital, as they can earn 
higher profits than by setting the price in a decentralized competition way12. Taking into 
consideration interaction between drug H and drug L in price and demand, price and 
                                                 
10 Supplier firms will not compete in price or quantity, but accept the offered price by monopolizing 
hospital, as they will fall into deficit if the firms compete each other.  
11 Reaction functions of respective firms. 
12 Cournot-type quantity competition. 
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demand in equilibrium are increasing functions of the cap on the official retail price as 
follows: 
pH* =(2vH sH+vLsH -2sH∆s)/(4sH-sL) = pH(vH
+
, vL
+
, sH
+
, sL
-
), 
pL* =(2vLsH+vHsL -sL∆s )/(4sH-sL) = pL(vH
+
, vL
+
, sH
+
, sL
-
). 
 
Prices of both high-quality and low-quality drugs are increasing functions of retail 
prices of all products in a market. The larger the differences of taste for quality, the 
lower the sales prices of high- and low-quality drugs.  
 
Here, the hospital will set as high a retail price as possible, 
        vH=   and vmaxHv L= . 
max
Lv
The total volume of this drug in this market is,   
         dH+dL= D(sL +pL)/sL= D{sL+(2vLsH+vHsL -sL∆s)/(4sH-sL)}/sL. 
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